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Abstract— Liquidity in the National Balancing Point (NBP) 
forward market during 2010-14 is examined using liquidity 
measures adopted from the financial literature. Since the sample 
period includes the date when the EU Regulation on Market 
Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) became in force, the 
question of whether changes in these measures reflect REMIT is 
also investigated. There is evidence of increased market 
transparency and competition, which are of interest to policy 
makers and regulators. No significant differences in the level of 
liquidity in the NBP one-month-ahead market appear to have 
followed the introduction of REMIT. 
Index Terms—Liquidity, natural gas, OTC markets, regulation, 
time-varying processes.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the liberalization and development of natural gas 
trading hubs in Europe, forward products have become a 
response to the increased exposure to price risk that energy 
companies face in the spot market. Financial institutions and 
non-physical traders were encouraged to participate in the 
European natural gas market, and have further contributed to 
the development of trading hubs. Yet, concerns over the 
impact of investors on market quality have been raised, mainly 
when trading occurs in the less transparent over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets [1][5]. 
To foster stability and transparency, the European 
Commission has introduced several regulatory proposals, 
among which is Regulation (EU) No. 1227/2011 on wholesale 
Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), which 
has been in force since December 2011 and effective from 7 
October 2015.  
Wholesale markets encompass both commodity and 
derivatives, which are either physically or financially settled. 
REMIT introduces a monitoring framework to detect and 
prevent market abuse, particularly in the OTC market. 
Monitoring requires regular and timely access to records of 
transactions as well as data on capacity and use of facilities for 
production, storage, consumption or transmission of electricity 
or natural gas. Market participants, including transmission 
system operators, suppliers, traders, producers, brokers and 
large users who trade wholesale energy products are required 
to provide that information to the Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators to ensure that prices are a fair and that 
no profits can be drawn from market abuse.  
Although higher transparency can reduce transaction costs and 
lower barriers to market entry, which may improve liquidity 
[6][7], REMIT’s effects on market quality and liquidity are 
unknown. For example, large commercial participants (e.g. 
energy companies) may be more knowledgeable about retail 
market developments and reluctant to post orders that would 
give away this informative advantage. This could lead to a 
deterioration of liquidity, e.g. [8], and higher market entry 
barriers for small commercial participants, thus compromising 
competitiveness, investment decisions and market efficiency. 
Moreover, the amount of reporting poses high administrative 
costs on market participants that may increase rather than 
reduce transaction costs, thus making the markets less 
attractive. Reduced trading activity from investors could 
decrease liquidity and lead to market instability. Hence, 
measuring liquidity is relevant to cost the hedging, undertake 
investment decisions, and to aid regulators and policy makers 
in monitoring market quality in the context of the evolving 
liberalized European energy markets. 
The aim of the present study is to assess liquidity in the NBP 
forward market, which is the main pricing hub in Europe [9] 
[10] and can be regarded as representative of the European 
natural gas market. Several measures of liquidity borrowed 
from the financial literature, and inspired by microstructure 
theory, e.g.[11] are used. A time-varying setting is adopted, in 
order to investigate changes in liquidity that may have 
followed the introduction of REMIT.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In 
Section II, the liquidity measures in energy and financial 
markets are reviewed. Section III describes the data and 
methods. The empirical results are reported in Section IV.  
Finally, Section V discusses the main findings and their 
implications.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Liquidity is a measure of market quality, defined as the ability 
to match buyers and sellers at the lowest transaction cost [11]. 
This definition focuses on the trading mechanisms and the 
evolution of asset pricing in the markets. Higher transactions 
costs imply lower asset prices and higher rate of returns, 
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required to compensate investors for bearing the liquidity cost. 
This aspect has been extensively investigated in the financial 
literature, e.g. [12]-[16], and denotes the ability of a market to 
offer sufficient opportunities for trading, such that individual 
trades have a limited impact on market prices. A lack of 
liquidity may impede trading, thereby making it easier for one 
market player to assume a dominant position, with 
implications for price fluctuations. 
Practitioners in natural gas and power markets usually refer to 
the churn ratio as measure of liquidity, e.g. [17]. This measure 
is the ratio of the trading volumes to the physical deliveries 
after trades: the higher this ratio, the greater is the market 
liquidity. Although simple to calculate and useful when 
comparing markets, the churn ratio is driven by physical 
deliveries which, in natural gas markets, are seasonal and 
weather-dependent. Furthermore, it encompasses trading 
activity, which may be associated with higher volatility, thus 
implying lower liquidity [18][19]. A rigorous and empirically 
relevant measure of liquidity in energy economics remains a 
challenge, mainly due to the multiple dimensions involved. 
Liquidity comprises important transactional properties of a 
market such as tightness (the cost of turning around a position 
over a short period), depth (the size of an order flow 
innovation required to change price of a given amount), and 
resiliency (the speed with which prices recover from a 
random, uninformative shock) [20]. In common, these 
properties define liquidity as a cost. However, there is no 
consensus on which would be the best measure to capture this 
cost. In the financial literature, different measures of spread 
and price impact have been proposed to assess market 
liquidity, e.g. [14] [21].  
 
Measures of spread 
Spread is a proxy for tightness. Commonly used measures are 
the quoted bid-ask spread and the effective spread [22]-[26]. 
They originate from a microstructure model where costumers 
trade only with market-makers, with bid-ask midpoint (mid-
quote) from the most recent best bid and ask centered, on 
average, on the fair asset value, [24] [26] [27]. The quoted 
bid-ask spread is defined as the difference between the most 
recent best ask and bid quotes. It represents the cost of a 
“round trip”, which is a purchase followed by a sale for small 
quantities. 
Stoll [28] observed that quoted bid-ask spreads may overstate 
transaction costs, because either traders are better informed 
than the market-makers, or market-makers adjust the bid-ask 
spread to control for their inventory. In this respect, the 
effective spread, which is defined as the difference between 
execution prices and mid-quotes, is an estimate of the actual 
transaction cost as it recognizes that trades may occur at 
prices other than the mid-quotes.  
The realized spread is similarly defined, but refers to the 
actual spread which follows a trade. It represents the non-
informational component of the effective spread, which 
should lead to a temporary deviation of the price from the 
underlying value, measured by the price reversal immediately 
after a trade, e.g. [24].  
To date, measures of spread were used, among others, by [13] 
[14] [21] [30] [31] to evaluate liquidity in financial markets. 
They were also employed to assess liquidity in the U.S. 
commodity markets by [32]-[34], and in the Nordic power 
market by [35].  
 
Measures of price impact 
In a high-frequency setting, measures of price impact are 
used to evaluate two aspects of liquidity: depth and 
resiliency, e.g.  [15] [36]. The price impact is defined as the 
temporary changes in execution prices following an order 
flow, where the order flow is set as the signed volume [15]. A 
measure of price impact is defined as “the price change 
associated with the aggregated signed square-root dollar- 
volume” over the same time interval [16]. [37]-[39] employed 
the expected return reversal to measure of price impact. The 
relationship between price changes and order flow, defined as 
difference between the numbers of buy and sell initiated 
trades, was adopted as proxy for price impact by e.g. [40]. In 
all, there is no consensus on how to assess liquidity, and 
different measures are explored in this study. 
 
III. DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF LIQUIDITY 
MEASURES 
The dataset 
This study uses a unique dataset consisting of tick-by-tick 
indicative quotes (best ask and best ask), execution prices and 
volumes from the inter-deal broker Tullett Prebon 
(http://www.tpinformation.com). One month-ahead forward 
NBP data for the period May 2010-December 2014 (461,663 
records) are available and represent about a third of the total 
trades in the sample period. Hence, liquidity dynamics are 
investigated in a particular trading venue. Notwithstanding, 
the share of the market is not small, and the analysis that 
follows should be informative with respect to the NBP 
forward market. 
As in previous literature, [41] [42], observations outside the 
interval 7:00-17:00, weekends, holidays, entries with negative 
spreads and outliers are removed. Simultaneous records at 
each time t are aggregated according to their medians (quotes 
and execution prices) and totals (volumes and number of 
trades). Approximately 2% of the sample is discarded, thus 
resulting in 78,019 records, which are then resampled at 60-
minute-frequency, as in [43] [44], to reduce effects of 
microstructure noise in high-frequency irregularly spaced 
series [45]. The first return of each day is discarded, as it 
might reflect adjustments to the overnight information. The 
final sample has 12,870 observations. Given the expected 
effect of the yearly seasonality of the demand for natural gas 
on quotes and execution prices and volumes, adjustment 
regressions are performed on the raw series to account for a 





Assessing liquidity in the NBP forward market 
The first measures adopted relate to the spread: the effective 
half-spread (EHS) and the realized half-spread (RHS), i.e. 
 ܧܪܵ� = ܦ�  ��−����                                    (1) ܴܪܵ� = ܦ�  ��−��+1��  ,                              (2) 
                            
where P τ is the execution price at the trading time τ, Mτ is the 
mid-quote at the same time. Dτ is the transaction direction 
indicator taking values 1, for buyer initiated transactions, and 
-1, for seller-initiated transactions, set according to [47]. The 
realized half-spread represents the compensation of the risk 
adverse liquidity supplier for bearing the price risk of an 
order imbalance [48]. Mτ+1 is the mid-quote after the 
transaction, a proxy for the post-transaction value. The 
realized half-spread contains the non-informational 
component of the effective half-spread, i.e. the transaction 
cost net of the asymmetric information component. The 
informational, and permanent, component is measured by the 
price impact of a transaction (PI), defined as: 
 �ܫ� = ܦ�  ��+1−����  .                                  (3) 
Effective half-spread, realized half-spread and price impact 
contribute to explain the costs of a single small transaction. 
However, liquidity adjusts to the pressure exerted by large 
transactions, often executed in multiple transactions [16]. In 
order to investigate this aspect in the NBP forward market, a 
second measure of price impact, from [16] [20], is adopted: 
 ��,� = ��ܵ�,� + ��,�,                               (4) 
where rn,t is the return time series over a fixed interval, t = 1,…,T in the rolling window n and Sn,t is the sum of the 
signed square-root of the order flow in the interval and 
window. The time-varying coefficient, λn, is estimated 
assuming rolling windows of size m=4500 (two business 
years) over the sample and increments between successive 
rolling windows of 1 period. This results in 6031 estimates of 
the price impact λ (N=T-m+1, with T=12,870). The 
reciprocal of λ can measure market depth, where a low value 
of λ implies that prices are less sensitive to order flow.   
 
IV. ESTIMATION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics of the daily liquidity measures are 
shown in Table I. On average, transaction costs in the NBP 
one month-ahead forward market are 0.312% (EHS), split in 
0.171% of RHS and 0.141% PI. This implies that the non-
informational component accounts for 55% of the EHS. The 
t-test computed on the difference between the EHS and PI is 
significant at 5% significance level. Nonparametric sign tests 
for the differences between medians and between quartiles of 
EHS and PI also reject equality. That is, the distributions of 
EHS and PI are significantly different. Figure 1 depicts the 
monthly medians of EHS, and suggests seasonal yearly  
pattern in the NBP one month-ahead forward market 
liquidity. 
Figure 1 Monthly medians of EHS 
TABLE I.  DAILY LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
Liquidity 
measure Mean St.Dev. Q25 Median Q75 
EHS 0.312 0.223 0.170 0.259 0.395 
RHS 0.171 0.186 0.076 0.143 0.240 
PI 0.141 0.145 0.057 0.109 0.196 
The table reports descriptive statistics of the daily time-weighted liquidity measures. For each measure, 
mean, standard deviation (St.Dev), lower quartile (Q25), median and upper quartile (Q75) are shown. 
 
Table II reports the correlation between liquidity measures 
and trading activity variables. Correlation is high and positive 
between EHS and RHS (0.642), and EHS and PI (0.541), and 
lower but negative between RHS and PI (-0.160). 
Furthermore, correlation is positive between RHS and 
number of transactions and trading volume (0.145 and 0.163, 
respectively), and negative between PI and number of 
transactions and trading volume (-0.101 and -0.120, 
respectively).  
Figure 2 shows the rolling estimates of the measure of price 
impact λ and estimated confidence intervals, based on the 
Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. A gradual decrease in the measure over the 
period up to March 2014 and an increase in level and variance 
in the subsequent period are observed. 
Table III summarizes the distributions of daily liquidity 
measures in the pre- and post-REMIT periods; t-tests and a 
nonparametric sign tests on the means and medians, 
respectively, fail to reject equality in the pre- and post-event 
samples. One-tail F-tests reject the null hypothesis of equal 
variances across the two sub-samples for all the liquidity 
measures. There is higher volatility in EHS and RHS after 
REMIT. 
Table IV reports estimates of the price impact measure λ in 
the pre- and post-REMIT periods. The Chow test rejects the 
null hypothesis of identical parameters across subsamples. 
Hence, there is a decrease in the price pressure exerted by the 






TABLE II.  SPEARMAN’S CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN 
LIQUIDITY MEASURES AND TRADING ACTIVITY VARIABLES 
Variable EHS RHS PI No. Trans. 
RHS 0.642**    
PI 0.541** -0.160**   
No. Trans. 0.009 0.145** -0.101**  
Trad. Vol. 0.011 0.163** -0.120** 0.796** 
The table reports Spearman’s correlation coefficients between the effective half-spread (EHS), realized 
half-spread (RHS), price impact (PI), number of transactions (No. of Trans) and trading volume (Trad. 
Vol). ** denotes significance at 5%.  
 
                    Figure 2 Rolling estimates of price impact measure λ 




Mean St.Dev. Q25 Median Q75 
Pre-REMIT, Obs.=413 
EHS 0.302 0.209 0.157 0.258 0.396 
RHS 0.169 0.173 0.062 0.142 0.250 
PI 0.140 0.160 0.045 0.111 0.194 
Post-REMIT, Obs.=754 
EHS 0.317 0.230 0.177 0.260 0.395 
RHS 0.173 0.193 0.083 0.144 0.236 
PI 0.140 0.135 0.065 0.108 0.202 
The table reports descriptive statistics of the daily time-weighted liquidity measures in the pre- and 
post-REMIT events. For each measure, mean, standard deviation (St. Dev), lower quartile (Q25), 
median and upper quartile (Q75) are shown. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
From Table II, the higher and positive correlation between 
the effective half-spread and the realized half-spread in 
relation to the price impact measure, PI, suggests that changes 
in liquidity appear to be more associated with inventory costs 
than asymmetric information. This result is also supported by 
the higher and positive correlation between realized half-
spread and trading activity.  Hence, factors influencing 
inventory risk and order imbalances play an important role in 
explaining liquidity, with implications for hedging decisions 
likewise inventory decisions and storage value, being the 
natural gas a storable commodity. 
It also appears that higher trading activity reduces liquidity in 
the NBP one-month ahead forward market. One possible 
interpretation of this finding would be that trading activity 
reduces dealers’ inventory positions, thus increasing the cost 
of immediacy. This would be in line with the estimates of 
price impact, λ, which show a positive association between 
NBP one-month ahead forward price returns and order flow, 
thus corroborating previous findings from financial markets, 
e.g.[40]. Thus, the gradual decrease in this association over 
the period 2010-13 would imply lower immediacy cost and 
greater depth and resilience in the NBP one-month ahead 
forward market, possibly driven by lower demand and high 
inventory, which reduced trading activity in the period. 
TABLE IV.  PRICE IMPACT MEASURE Λ  IN THE PRE- AND POST-REMIT 
EVENT  
Event  Constant λ R2 
Pre-REMIT 0.469** (0.235) 0.090***(0.01) 0.291 
Post-REMIT -0.228 (0.183) 0.076***(0.006) 0.228 
The table reports estimate of the price impact measure λ in the pre- and post-REMIT events. ***, **, * 
denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
 
During 2013-14, NBP saw a drop in physical deliveries, in 
favor of the TTF hub [49] and a progressive shift of traders 
from the OTC to exchanges.  Thus, in 2014, the premium of 
oil-linked contracts over hub prices in Continental Europe 
was a strong incentive for buyers to buy from hubs, in 
anticipation of higher volumes to be taken at lower oil-
indexed prices, following the drop in oil-prices (July 2014). 
This likely behavior together with the gradual exit of 
investors from the commodities markets, observed since 
2013, might have contributed to the increase in price 
pressure, and in turn to reduce liquidity during the second 
half of 2014.  
No evidence of significant changes in liquidity after REMIT 
is found in the data, thus implying neither deterioration nor 
improvement in the competitiveness and efficiency of the 
NBP one-month forward market. However, the measures of 
spread and price impact indicate higher volatility since 
REMIT. Although increases in volatility may be reasonably 
explained by the decrease in the trading activity over the 
period, it may also reflect the lower frequency of investors in 
the market. Higher administrative costs may have not directly 
affected liquidity, but may have increased its variability.  
The findings of this study are limited to the share of market 
here analyzed. Furthermore, the dataset does not discriminate 
between commercial and financial investors, thus the impact 
of REMIT on different trade types cannot be assessed. 
Nevertheless, the present study illustrates the usefulness of 
liquidity measures from financial markets to describe changes 
in liquidity in physical markets, in particular, natural gas 
markets. In this respect, the price impact measure, λ, has 
helped to link trading activity to price returns, thus enabling 
the assessment of the depth and resilience of the NBP one-
month ahead forward market. Such aspects cannot be captured 
by the churn ratio, thus making this measure valuable to 
regulators when monitoring EU market quality, mainly after 
the disclosure of transaction data following REMIT. 
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